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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
09/777,761	02/06/2001	Gerald B. Murphy	P04722US0	4274	
22885 7590 03/23/2007 MCKEE, VOORHEES & SEASE, P.L.C.			EXAMINER		
801 GRAND AVENUE SUITE 3200 DES MOINES, IA 50309-2721			NAJARIAN, LENA		
			· ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
DES MOTIVES	,, 1110,000 2121		3626		
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			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
	•		03/23/2007	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.		Applicant(s)	
09/777,761		MURPHY, GERALD B.	
	Examiner	Art Unit	
	Lena Najarian	3626	

	Examiner	Art Onit				
	Lena Najarian	3626				
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence add	ress			
THE REPLY FILED <u>16 March 2007</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS AP		•				
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on this application, applicant must timely file one of the follow places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a No a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance time periods:	the same day as filing a Notice of ving replies: (1) an amendment, aff tice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in c	Appeal. To avoid aba idavit, or other evider compliance with 37 C	ice, which FR 41.31; or (3)			
a) $\boxtimes$ The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.					
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.						
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or ( TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 7	06.07(f).					
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of exunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b) NOTICE OF APPEAL	tension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply origi than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The approprinally set in the final Offi	iate extension fee ce action; or (2) a			
<ol> <li>The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exte a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed</li> </ol>	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of th				
<u>AMENDMENTS</u>						
The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection,			ecause			
(a) They raise new issues that would require further co (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belo		i E below);				
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bet	• •	ducing or simplifying	the issues for			
appeal; and/or (d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a	corresponding number of finally rei	ected claims				
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).		00.00 0.00.				
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.1.		mpliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).			
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s)			,			
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>		timely filed amendme	ent canceling the			
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is protected. The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		ll be entered and an e	explanation of			
Claim(s) allowed: <u>NONE</u> . Claim(s) objected to: <i>NONE</i> .						
Claim(s) rejected: <u>15 and 17-29</u> .						
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: <u>NONE</u> .						
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE						
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good answas not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>						
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to of showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under apper y and was not earlier presented. S	al and/or appellant fa ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(	ils to provide a 1).			
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attacl	nea.			
11. ☑ The request for reconsideration has been considered bu See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowa	nce because:			
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s).	<i>n</i>				
J. bays						
	SUPERVISORY PATEN	IT EXAMINER				

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Continuation of 11.

Applicant's arguments filed 3/16/07 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant's arguments will be addressed hereinbelow in the order in which they appear in the response filed 3/16/07.

(1) Applicant argues that O'Brien does not teach an income approach. O'Brien's approach is not an income approach to a marketing plan, it is a price approach.

As per the first argument, the Examiner respectfully submits that O'Brien discloses at p. 4 factors affecting an individual's marketing plan such as attitudes toward price and income risk. As such, it is readily apparent that income is a factor in O'Brien. In addition, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

(2) Applicant argues that O'Brien's approach is based on a producer's self-assessment, including of expected price trends. The result is a marketing plan that can not be relied upon by those providing financing.

As per the second argument, the Examiner respectfully submits that Remley was relied on for the feature of receiving financing (para. 41 of Remley). In response to applicant's argument against the reference individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

(3) Applicant argues that O'Brien's approach does not underwrite pre-selling by a level of crop insurance.

As per the third argument, the Examiner respectfully submits that O'Brien discloses the use of crop insurance (pages 13-14 and 19 of O'Brien). The purpose of the insurance is to protect the proportion of expected production or expected crop revenue (p. 19 of O'Brien). As such, it is readily apparent that O'Brien teaches that the pre-selling is underwritten by the level of crop insurance.

(4) Applicant argues that O'Brien's system does not provide for any type of numeric scoring system or weighting.

As per the fourth argument, the Examiner respectfully submits that Hay was relied on for the features involving scoring. In response to applicant's argument against the reference individually, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

(5) Applicant argues that O'Brien does not first calculate a level of income, then necessary pre-sell quantities, and then a level of crop insurance. O'Brien suggests determining a level of crop insurance and using that as a guideline for determining pre-sell quantities. Applicant also argues that O'Brien does not determine the minimum level of crop to be sold before determining the amount of crop insurance.

As per the fifth argument, one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For example, note page 3 of the Office Action mailed 1/3/07 where the Examiner relied on Hay for the step of determining pre-sell quantities (para. 62 of Hay).